University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 14
Number 2 Spring, 1984

Article 3

1984

The A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
M. Peter Moser

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Recommended Citation
Moser, M. Peter (1984) "The A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 14: No. 2, Article
3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol14/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

The A.B.A. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct
A Selective Commentary
by M. Peter Moser

n August, 1983, the American Bar
Association adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules)! to replace the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model CPR? as the standards governing the ethical practice of law by
American lawyers. The Model Rules
were developed by the A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards during six years of analysis
and public debate in response to criticisms of the standards in the Model CPR.

I

The Commission, popularly called
the "Kutak Commission" after its chairman, Robert J. Kutak, was composed of
both lawyers and non-lawyers. Its Final
Draft (Proposed Model Rules),3 issued
on May 31, 1981, was amended during
three A.B. A. House of Delegate sessions
and finally was overwhelmingly adopted
last summer by voice vote at the A.B.A. 's
Annual Meeting held in Atlanta. State
high courts and bar associations across
the country, including the Maryland
State Bar Association, now are considering the Model Rules as a replacement for state CPR's. Until adopted by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the
Model Rules have no binding effect on
the conduct of lawyers in Maryland.
This article provides commentary on
some of the issues that Maryland and
other states will consider. It compares
the different formats of the Model
Rules and the Model CPR and highlights some of the advantages of the
Model Rules' format. In addition, some
of the issues that generated the most
controversy during the A.B.A.'s consideration of the Model Rules are examined in relation to both the Model CPR
and the Maryland CPR.
S-The Law Forum/Spring, I984

Format
The format of the Model Rules is
similar to the formats of the American
Law Institute Restatements and the
Uniform Commercial Code. Each Rule
states a principle and is followed by an
official comment. "The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of
the Rule.... The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but
the text of each Rule is authoritative."4
Research notes are to accompany each
Rule and be kept up to date as the Model Rules are interpreted by courts and
ethics committees.
In contrast, the Model CPR has a
three-tier format with nine Canons stating "axiomatic norms" under which are
grouped "aspirational" Ethical Considerations and "mandatory" Disciplinary
Rules. s Although the drafters of the
Model CPR intended that disciplinary

action should be taken against a lawyer
only for violations of the Disciplinary
Rules and that the Ethical Considerations should be regarded only as goals
to be achieved, some courts have utilized
Ethical Considerations and Canons as
the foundation for discipline. 6
The more fundamental Ethical Considerations (those stating duties that
clients and the public expect lawyers always to fulfill) are mandatory Model
Rules. The CPR Canons, which often
inaccurately describe the disciplinary
standards grouped under them, are entirely eliminated. As a result, the Model
Rules are clearer, and practitioners are
less likely to be misled about the minimum standards to which they must
adhere. 7
The Model Rules are organized under
eight functional headings that are more
descriptive and logically categorized
than the Canons in the Model CPR.
This format makes the answers to specific questions easier to find. A lawyer
seeking to resolve a problem can locate
the applicable Model Rule by turning to
the heading that best describes the context in which the problem arises. Under
the heading "Client-Lawyer Relationship," Rules 1.1 through 1.16 set out
the general obligations of all lawyers to
their clients. Additionally, in the separate headings of "Counselor" and
"Advocate," the Model Rules distinguish between the lawyer's duties when
acting as a counselor and when serving
as an advocate. 8 The obligations of lawyers in other transactions are grouped
under other appropriate headings. This
more rational framework of the Model
Rules provides clearer and more comprehensive guidelines for lawyer conduct. Consequently, lawyers can resolve

ethical dilemmas more quickly and accurately using the Model Rules than
they can using the Model CPR.9

Substantive Issues
The most hotly debated issues in the
Model Rules concern client confidences
and the regulation of lawyer advertising
and solicitation. These Rules are the
ones whose counterparts in the Model
CPR vary substantially from state to
state. Because of these and other local
variations, consideration of the Model
Rules in each state should include careful analysis of local interpretations of
the state's existing CPR in order to determine which of the Model Rules
should be amended to conform to state
policy.
The following issues are discussed in
this commentary: (1) the extent to
which communications between lawyers and clients should remain confidential in cases of client crimes and
fraud;lO (2) duties of lawyers when representing organizations, such as corporations;l1 (3) restrictions on advertising
and soliciting by lawyers seeking to perform professional services for profit
and the use of tradenames;!2 (4) requirements concerning lawyers' fees,
such as the use of written fee agreements;!3 and (5) conflicts of interest,
including certain transactions with
clients that are singled out in the Model
Rules for specific limitations.14

Client Confidences
Provisions of the Model Rules that
relate to "client confidences"!5 evoked
the greatest controversy. Lawyers' revelations of client confidences in order (i)
to comply with law, (ii) to prevent
client crimes and frauds, and (iii) to rectify the consequences of a client's misuse of the attorney-client relationship
to perpetrate crimes and frauds are the
areas where lawyers' duties to their
clients and to the public directly conflict
and require a careful balancing of competing interests.
Compliance With Law The Kutak
Commission's Proposed Model Rule
1.6(b)( 5) permitted a lawyer to reveal
client confidences to the extent believed
necessary "to comply with the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law."
Although Model CPR DR 4-101(C)(2)
says essentially the same thing, the
A.B.A. House of Delegates nevertheless
deleted clause (b)(5) from Rule 1.6.
This deletion creates needless confusion in resolving conflicts between duties imposed by other Rules.
Model Rule 1.2(d) says, "[a] lawyer

shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .... "
Rule 8.4 provides that "professional
misconduct" for which lawyers will be
disciplined includes criminal conduct
adversely reflecting "on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects";!6 conduct
that involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation";!7 or conduct
"that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. "!8 How can a lawyer in
whom a client has confided information
that is criminally or fraudulently incriminating honor that client's confidence as required by Rule 1.6 without

When read together,
Model Rules 1.6 and
3.3 require a lawyer
to reveal past client
perjury where the
lawyer has
represented the client
in court, but not
where the client is
about to consummate
a criminal fraud
through the use of
the lawyer's work
product.
violating Rules 1.2(d) or 8.4? The only
sensible construction of these competing Rules is to require the lawyer to
reveal client confidences if necessary in
order to comply with Rules 1.2(d) or
8.4, even if such compliance violates
Rule 1.6. Cautiously worded support
for this construction is found in the
Comment to Rule 1.6, which states:
The lawyer must comply with the
final orders of a court ... requiring
the lawyer to give information
about the client, [but first the lawyer must invoke the attorneyclient evidentiary privilege] ....
The Rules of Professional Conduct in various circumstances permit or require a lawyer to disclose
information relating to the repres-

entation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3
and 4.1. In addition to these provisions, a lawyer may be obligated
or permitted by other provisions
of law to give information about a
client. Whether another provision of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is
a matter or interpretation beyond
the scope of these Rules, but a
presumption should exist against
such a supersession.
Rule 1.6 would provide clearer guidance
if it simply specified that disclosure of a
client confidence does not violate Rule
1.6 if the lawyer is required by another
Rule, other law or a court order to
disclose client confidences.
Prospective Client Crimes and Frauds
In DR 4-101(C)(3), the Model CPR
permits a lawyer to disclose "the intention of his client to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent
the crime." The Kutak Commission's
Proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)( 1) limited
permissible disclosures to those necessary to prevent the client from committing "a criminal or fraudulent act ... likely
to result in death or substantial bodily
harm, or substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another [emphasis
added]." The A.B.A. House of Delegates
limited permissible disclosures further
by deleting the italicized language and
amending the Rule so that disclosure is
permitted only to the extent the lawyer,
"reasonably" believes is necessary to
prevent "imminent death or substantial
bodily harm."!9 Some people have criticized this additional limitation, claiming that it subverts the public interest by
requiring lawyers to allow their clients to
perpetrate serious crimes and frauds
which lawyers should be given the discretion to prevent.
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Crime or Fraud Using Lawyers'
Services
In Proposed Model Rule
1.6(b )(3), the Kutak Commission proposed that a lawyer be permitted to disclose client confidences to the extent
believed necessary "to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or
fraudulent act in the commission of
which the lawyer's services had been
used. "20 The A.B.A. House of Delegates deleted this provision, yet it refused to amend Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), which "requires
disclosures of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6" if a lawyer
comes to know that material evidence
that the lawyer has offered is false, and
other remedial measures fail. Rule 3.3
is narrower than DR 7 -102(B)( 1) of the
Maryland CPR, which requires disclosure of any fraud by the client and not
merely disclosure where the lawyer has
offered false evidence.
When read together, Model Rules
1.6 and 3.3 require a lawyer to reveal
past client perjury where the lawyer has
represented the client in a court, but
not where the client is about to consummate a criminal fraud through the use
of the lawyer's work product, in which
case the lawyer is required only to withdraw from providing legal services and
to keep silent. The Comment to Rule
1.6 explains, however, that
[n]either this Rule [1.6] nor Rule
1.8(b) [prohibitng use of client
confidences to client's disadvantage] nor Rule 1.16( d) [protection of a client's interest after
withdrawal] prevents the lawyer
from giving notice of the fact of
withdrawal, and the lawyer may
also withdraw or disaffirm any
opinion, document, affirmation, or
the like [emphasis added].21
One may question whether withdrawal
or disaffirmance of the lawyer's work
product would sufficiently protect the
lawyer against charges of criminal or
civil fraud in all cases. Moreover, Model
Rules 1.2(d) and 8.4 may require the
lawyer to disclose client confidences,
depending on the circumstances. Clearer
guidance would be afforded if the Kutak
proposal had been retained. 22
The A.B.A. House of Delegates'
amendment to Proposed Model Rule
1.6 was said to be necessary to further
the policy that encourages clients to reveal all of the relevant facts in order
to obtain effective representation. This
policy requires that information the
client gives the lawyer to assist in the
IO-The Law Forum/Spring, I984

representation must be kept in strictest
confidence.
Basing the change on this worthy policy seems misplaced. When the client
lies or misrepresents the transaction to
the lawyer in order to advance the
client's own criminal or fraudulent purpose, the false information interferes
with the lawyer's lawful representation
of the client. By lying or misrepresenting the facts, the client intends to gain
the lawyer's unwitting assistance to
further the client's illegal or fraudulent
pursuits in a way that would be unavailable if the client had been truthful with
his lawyer in the first place. The client
knows that the lawyer may not knowingly help to commit a fraud or crime.

Model Rule 1.13
now provides
necessary guidance
for practitioners
when representing
corporations and
other organizations
whose employees act
illegally and against
the organization's
interests.
If the client nevertheless retains the
right to prohibit the lawyer from disclosing the facts even after the lawyer
learns that the relationship has been
abused, then the client is encouraged to
lie initially to his lawyer until the crime or
fraud has been consumated, comfortable
in the knowledge that the lawyer's
lips are sealed. This arrangement actually subverts the policy of encouraging a
full and frank disclosure by clients of all
of the relevant facts and instead encourages clients to misuse lawyers' services.

Perjury by Criminal Defendants
Differences among the states' judicial
determinations and the lack of definitive statements by the Supreme Court
create special problems in the case of
the perjurious client on trial for a
crime. Although Rule 3.3 is workable
in the context of civil litigation, it furnishes inadequate guidance to the lawyer in a criminal case.

Disclosures of a criminal defendant
to his lawyer are likely to be protected
by the Sixth Amendment and by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as
well.23 The Comment to Rule 3.3 recognizes the possibility that these constitutional rights may prevail over the
lawyer's duty to disclose described in
the Rule. But neither the Rule nor the
Comment provides ethical guidance for
a criminal defense counsel in cases of
sudden perjury or where the accused
insists on testifying falsely. Clearer
guidance might be provided by specifically incorporating in either Rule 3.3 or
the accompanying Comment the substance of the A.B. A. Criminal Justice
Standards. Rule 3.3 might then read as
follows:
(e) Notwithstanding subsections
(a) through (d), a lawyer for a defendant in a criminal case shall not
disclose that the client has perpetrated a fraud or testified falsely. However, if the lawyer knows that the
client will testify falsely, the lawyer
shall:
( 1) counsel the client against
such testimony; and
(2) not assist the client in preparing such testimony; and
(3) not assist the client in testifying except to the extent
necessary to avoid revealing to the
fact finder the lawyer's knowledge
that the testimony is false; and
( 4) not refer to such testimony in the lawyer's argument to
the fact finder unless the circumstances of the case require such a
reference in order to avoid revealing
to the fact finder the lawyer's
knowledge that the testimony is
false. 24

Representing An Organization
Model Rules 1.13(a), (d) and (e) define the lawyer's relationships with organizations (such as corporations) that
the lawyer may represent and the lawyer's relationships with its officers and
other constituents more clearly than EC
5-18 in the Model CPR.
Model Rules 1.13(b) and (c) detail
the steps that must be taken by a lawyer
who represents an organization when an
officer or employee acts illegally and
where his action might be imputed to
the organization and cause it substantial
injury. If the organization's "highest authority" refuses to act to rectify the
problem, then the lawyer "may resign
in accordance with Rule 1.16." According to the Comment to Model Rule
1.6, the lawyer may disclose the organ i-

zation's confidences only in accordance
with Rule 1.6.
Proposed Model Rule 1.13( c) would
have permitted a lawyer to disclose certain confidences of an organization
client notwithstanding the limitations
of Rule 1.6, when the lawyer reasonably
believed that the organization's highest
authority acted contrary to the organization's interests and that disclosure was
in the organization's best interests.
Some critics of this proposal claimed
that it would result in lawyer whistleblowing, which would grossly interfere
with accepted standards of corporate
governance. Amendments adopted in
February, 1983 to cure these alleged
(~roblems rendered Rules l.13(a) and
(d) essentially impossible to apply.25
These imperfections were corrected at
the August, 1983 House session. Rule
1.13 now provides necessary guidance
for practitioners when representing
corporations and other organizations
whose employees act illegally and
against the organization's interests.
Controversy may continue nevertheless
over whether the Kutak Commission's
proposal permitting disclosure notwithstanding Rule 1.6 should be substituted
for the House's more limited version.

Advertising And Soliciting
Model Rules 7.1 through 7.3, governing
advertising and solicitation, have
essentially the same literal effect as
DR 2-101, DR 2-103 and DR 2-104 of
the Maryland CPR. False or misleading
advertising and solicitation of professional employment for pecuniary benefit are prohibited. The term "solicit"
includes not only in-person contact,
but also written communications directed to specific recipients to recruit
them as clients in particular matters.
Thus, general mailings are permitted,
but targeted mailings are not. Such a
prohibition could impair a lawyer's
First Amendment rights.
In MSBA Ethics Opinion 81-21
(February 16, 1981), the Maryland
State Bar Association Ethics Committee enunciated guidelines that have had
the effect of permitting not only general
mailings but also letters and advertisements seeking employment in specific
legal matters as well. 26 This Opinion anticipated the Supreme Court's analysis
of lawyer advertising articulated in In re
RM.].27 decided in 1982, a year later.
The lawyer in RM.]. had mailed announcements of the opening of his new
office to persons outside the group consisting of "lawyers, clients, former

('I accept the four thousand years in Limbo with the understanding
that it in no way constitutes an admission of wrongdoing."
Drawing by Lorenz; © 1983 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

clients, personal friends, and relatives,"
to whom such announcements may be
sent under DR 2-102(A)(2). The Court
noted that the state policy of preventing
false or misleading advertising might
just as well be achieved by requiring
lawyers to file copies of all mailings
with the state's disciplinary committee.
The Court pointed to the Kutak Commission's less stringent requirement set
forth in Proposed Model Rule 7 .2(b),
which required lawyers to retain written communications for one year. 32
Since the record failed to disclose why
less restrictive limitations would not
suffice to achieve the governmental
purpose of preventing false or misleading advertising, the state's absolute prohibition under DR 2-102(A) was held
to be an invalid restraint upon the lawyer's First Amendment rights. Disciplinary charges against the lawyer were
therefore dismissed.
Although the Comment to Rule 7.3
rationalizes that "direct mail solicitation cannot be effectively regulated by
means less drastic than outright prohibition," it states no reason why direct
mail solicitation without subsequent

personal contact cannot be as effectively regulated as general mailings, as the
Supreme Court suggested in RM.]. Accordingly, before adopting an absolute
prohibition against all direct mail solicitation, the states should determine if a
lesser restraint will not suffice to effectuate the underlying policy. States
should be prepared to justify the more
stringent regulation if it is to be applied.

Specialty Designations Model Rule
7.4, which prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying that he is a specialist, is
more restrictive than DR 2-105 of the
Maryland CPR, which has the effect of
permitting a lawyer to advertise as a
specialist, so long as the lawyer can
prove that the claim is truthful.
Tradenames Model Rule 7.5 expressly permits lawyers to practice under tradenames, so long as the tradenames are not false or misleading. A
trade name also must not imply connection with a governmental agency or a
public or charitable legal services organization, presumably because use of
such a name would be misleading per se.
Spring, 1984/The Law Forum-ll
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Disciplinary Rule 2-102(A) of the
Maryland CPR prohibits practicing under a tradename, but permits the continued use in firm names of the name of
any deceased or retired member of the
firm or a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland upheld the constitutionality of the tradename proscription in In re Corporate Name-Oldtowne,29
in which an admitted purpose for using
a tradename rather than the firm name
at a new location was to prevent regular
clients of the firm from knowing about
the connection between the practices at
the two locations. In this case, the
Maryland court adopted the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Friedman v.
Rogers,30 which upheld a Texas statute
prohibiting optometrists from practicing under tradenames.
In deciding whether to abandon the
absolute prohibition of tradenames in
DR 2-102(A), states should consider
amending the Comment to Model Rule
7.S or promulgating guidelines to specify additional types of tradenames that
are misleading per se. 31 States should
also consider imposing a requirement
that the name of at least one lawyer admitted to practice in the state be clearly
identifiable as the lawyer responsible to
clients for the legal services rendered
under the tradename.

Lawyers' Fees
One improvement made by Model
Rule 1.5 is the requirement that lawyers' fees be "reasonable" rather than
not "clearly excessive" as provided in
DR 2-106(A) of the Model CPR. The
factors to be considered under Rule 1.5
in determining the reasonableness of a
fee are the same as those set out in DR
2-106(B).
Much of the A.B.A. House of Delegates debate over fee provisions centered on whether fee agreements must
be in writing, as the Kutak Commission
proposed. Fee disputes are, of course, a
major source of complaints by clients
to bar associations and disciplinary
agencies. Rule 1.S(b) as adopted provides that where a lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the lawyer
must communicate the basis or rate of
the fee to the client, "preferably in
writing. "
The House of Delegates added to
Proposed Model Rule 1.5 the DR 2106(C) prohibition against contingent
fees in criminal cases, as well as a prohibition against contingent fees in certain

domestic relations matters, a restriction
that was not specified in the Model
CPR. The wisdom of these prohibitions
continues to be a subject of debate.
Both Model Rule 1.S( e) and Model
CPR EC 2-22 permit the division of
fees among lawyers. However, the
Model Rule requires a written agreement with the client where the division
is based on joint lawyer responsibility,
rather than on the specific services rendered by each lawyer. In all cases, the
total fee must be reasonable.

Conflicts of Interest
Model Rule 1.7, which sets out the
general conflict of interest rules, is
clearer and simpler than its Model CPR
counterparts. For example, Rule 1. 7(b)
specifies that, even if the client consents, a lawyer shall not represent the
client where the representation may be
materially limited by the lawyer's own
interests, unless the lawyer reasonably
believes that the representation will not
be adversely affected. Compare DR S101(A). Rule 1.7(b), unlike its CPR
counterparts, also applied where the
conflict arises after the lawyer has been
engaged, as well as where the conflict
exists before representation commences.
Compare DR S-lOS.

The factors to be
considered under
Rule 1.5 in
determining the
reasonableness of a
fee are the same as
those set out in
DR 2 .. 106(B).
Model Rule 1.9 improves upon the
Model CPR because it establishes a lawyer's duties to former clients in terms
that go beyond simply maintaining
client confidences. Compare EC 4-6;
EC 4-S.
Model Rule 1.8 provides specific
prohibitions and limitations in certain
kinds of transactions which, by their
very nature, involve conflicts of interest. Under Rule 1.8(c) lawyers are
prohibited from preparing an instrument for a client giving the lawyer or a
member of the lawyer's immediate fam-

ily a substantial gift, unless the client is
related to the donee. Compare EC 5-5.
Disciplinary Rule 5-l03(B) of the
Model CPR prohibits lawyers from advancing or guaranteeing financial assistance to clients other than advancing
court costs and expenses of investigation or medical examinations, and then
only if the client remains ultimately liable for these expenses. This prohibition
has proven impractical where indigents
are involved and where, in class action
representation, side agreements for payment of fees or expenses are prohibited.
Some lawyers have resorted to the subterfuge of making written agreements
that clients will reimburse expenses regardless of outcome, without ever intending to enforce the agreements. Rule
l.8(e) sensibly permits lawyers to advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which "may be
contingent on the outcome," and allows lawyers to advance these expenses
for indigent clients without expectations of reimbursement.
Model Rule l.8( a) sets out meaningful requirements for lawyers entering
into business relationships with their
clients. These requirements are clearer
than those set out in DR 5-l04(A). The
Model Rules require that the terms of
such relationships must be fair and reasonable to the client and fully disclosed
in writing. The client must have a reasonable opportunity to consult independent counsel and must consent in
writing to the arrangement. It is questionable, however, whether these stringent requirements should also be made
applicable to cases where a lawyer simply
acquires a pecuniary interest that
may be adverse to a client's interests,
especially when the lawyer's representation of the client is unrelated to the pecuniary interest being acquired.

Notes
1

2

3

4

5
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9
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Conclusion
The Model Rules were developed largely as a response to recent concerns expressed by lawyers and the public about
how to deal with some of the more difficult issues in the field of professional
responsibility. The Model Rules adopted by the A.B.A. provide clearer guidelines than the Model CPR and are more
helpful in resolving the ethical problems
that confront many lawyers. Nevertheless,
before adopting the Model Rules, the
states should consider making appropriate changes to reflect important variations in disciplinary policies that have
gained local acceptance.
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52 U.S.L.W. 1 (August 16. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL RULES].
THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY. which was adopted by the
A.B.A. in 1969 to replace the Canons of Professional Ethics, became effective in Maryland in 1970. See MD. R. P. 1230 and App.
F. But see Maryland CPR Canon 2 and DR
7-1 02(B)(I).
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, A.B.A. COMMISSION
ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSION AL STANDARDS
(1981) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED MODEL
RULES].
See MODEL RULES, supra note I, Preamble:
A Lawyer's Responsibilities.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1980)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL CPR].
See Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards:
Broad v. Narrow Proscriptions, 65 IOWA L.
REV. 1386 (1980).
Ambiguities in the MODEL CPR that are
eliminated in the MODEL RULES include: (i)
adding Rule 1.4 (Communication) (which
requires a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter) in
place of EC 9-2; (ii) including Rule 1.8(c) (a
prohibition against preparing an instrument
for a non-relative client that gives the lawyer
a substantial gift) in place of EC 5-5; and (iii)
eliminating the nebulous concept of "appearance of impropriety" (Canon 9), which
has sometimes been used unfairly to
discipline lawyers.
Compare e.g., MODEL RULES 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3
and MODEL RULES 3.1 through 3.9.

See Moser, The Model Rules: Is One Format
Better Than Another? 67 A.B.A.]. 1624 (Dec.
1981) (supporting the Model Rules); Kettlewell, Keep the Format of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,
67 A.B.A.].
1628 (Dec. 1981); and Brief in Support of
Retention of CPR Format, National Organization of Bar Counsel (November 23, 1981).
See MODEL RULES 1.6 (Confidentiality of
Information), 3.3 (Candor Toward the
Tribunal) and 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others). Rule 1.13 (Organization as
Client) "does not limit or expand the
lawyer's responsiblity" to maintain client
confidences. MODEL RULES 1.13 Comment
(Relation to Other Rules). Cj. PROPOSED
MODEL RULES. See also MODEL RULES 1.2(d/.
Related provisions of the MODEL CPR
appear under Canon 4 (A Lawyer Should
Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a
Client), Canon 7 (A Lawyer Should
Represent a Client Zealously Within the
Bounds of the Law), and Canon 1 (A Lawyer
Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity
and Competence of the Legal Profession).
See MODEL RULE 1.13 (Organization as
Client) and MODEL CPR EC 5-18.
See MODEL RULES 7.1 ,through 7.5. The
MODEL CPR provisions are DR 2-101
(Publicity), DR 2-102 (Professional Notices,
Letterheads and Offices), DR 2-103 (Recommendation of Professional Employment),
DR 2-104 (Suggestion of Need of Legal
Services), and DR 2-105 (Limitation of
Practice). DR 2-101, DR 2-102, DR 2104(A)(2) and DR 2-105 of the Maryland
CPR differ substantially from the related
DR's in the MODEL CPR.
See MODEL RULE 1.5 (Fees). The MODEL CPR
provisions are principally DR 2-106, DR 2107 and the related EC's.
continued on page I6
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their dependencies and often celebrate
their release at the closest bar or with a
fix.

A Program For Young People
and First-Time Offenders of
Non-Violent Crimes
What kinds of offenders ought to be
imprisoned? I suggest that the way of
enlightened punishment is to incarcerate
only those convicts who have shown
themselves to be a danger to the public
or to themselves and whose acts have
been so reprehensible that the judicial
system must demonstrate in the only
way it can - by imposing a sentence
involving the loss of liberty - that
society will not tolerate such conduct.
Murderers, rapists, arsonists, child
molesters and armed robbers deserve
prison sentences. As for the rest, I
suggest that no judge or magistrate
should sentence an offender to jail
unless there is no reasonable alternative.

First.-time, non-violent
offenders or those
who commit
victimless crimes
ought to expiate their
sins in better ways
than serving prison
sentences.
First-time, non-violent offenders or
those who commit victimless crimes
ought to expiate their sins in better
ways than serving prison sentences. We
can, as I mentioned earlier, sentence
those who commit non-violent alcohol
and drug-related offenses to neighborhood rehabilitation facilities. We can
compel other non-violent offenders to:
" Make restitution to the victim.
* Complete a reasonable educational
program of public school equivalence, so that they can at least read
and write.
* Undergo psychiatric or other appropriate counseling.
* Receive vocational testing and
counseling.
" Maintain full-time employment and
support their dependents.
" Remain trouble-free for a prolonged period of time.
" Perform community service for a
specific length of time.
16-The Law Forum/Spring, 1984

Community Service As an
Alternative to Imprisonment
Community service is an effective
way for offenders to repay their debts
to society. Most responsible probation
officers provide judges with pre-sentence reports that outline the offender's
life and habits. These reports indicate,
among other things, the offender's
hobbies, interests and talents.
An appropriate alternative sentence
might be to assign the offender to work
with retarded or disabled children for
seven to eight hours every weekend for
a year or longer. Performing community
service is one way the offender can
utilize his abilities to do some good for
society.
If the offender is a competent reader,
he can be required to record texts or
read to the blind every Saturday or
Sunday for a few years. If he is handy
with tools, he can be assigned to work
at homes for the aged and infirmed that
sorely need carpenters, brick masons
and handymen. If he is a church-goer or
interested in religion, then perhaps he
could drive disabled congregants to
their Sabbath worship or to meetings or
deliver their meals in the evenings.
There are untold community needs that
can be fulfilled by first-time, nonviolent offenders. It is only a matter of
matching the resources to the needs.

Conclusion
Good sentencing calls for an accurate
perception of both the offender's place
in the criminal spectrum as well as
society's need to protect itself against
violence. There is no easy way to reduce
the cost of crime by means that will be
both punitive and rehabilitative, Jailing
costs more than any other form of
social control. Even if we do need more
jails, jails alone are not enough.
In his address to the American Bar
Association in 1981, Chief Justice
Warren Burger emphasized that "[w]e
must accept the reality that to confine
offenders behind walls without trying
to change them is an expensive folly
with short-term benefits." When you
cut your finger you do not necessarily
have to go to the hospital to be
bandaged. Maybe jails, like hospitals,
should confine only those for whom
there is no reasonable alternative. Z
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